A viral social media post falsely claimed that 60% of crimes in Japan are committed by Chinese nationals, following the stabbing of a 10-year-old Japanese boy in Shenzhen on September 18, 2024 [bc9a0fcb]. The post, shared by user MR. 486, garnered over 697,000 views and 4,406 likes, highlighting the rapid spread of misinformation [bc9a0fcb]. However, Japanese police statistics reveal that Chinese nationals were involved in only 1.123% of all prosecutions in Japan last year, with 3,028 cases out of 269,550 total prosecutions [bc9a0fcb]. Analysts express concern over rising nationalist sentiments and the role of social media in spreading disinformation, which can exacerbate tensions between Japan and China [bc9a0fcb].
In the wake of the stabbing incident, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa met with Chinese counterpart Wang Yi at the UN General Assembly, demanding clarity on the incident [bc9a0fcb]. The diplomatic engagement underscores the sensitivity surrounding the issue, especially given the historical context of Japan-China relations. In a related response, Japan Airlines canceled a commemorative event for 50 years of flights to China due to the incident, reflecting the strain on cultural and business ties [bc9a0fcb].
Meanwhile, some Chinese citizens have expressed condolences for the victim, contrasting with the surge of online hate speech that has emerged since the stabbing [bc9a0fcb]. This situation illustrates the complex dynamics of public sentiment and the impact of social media narratives on international relations. The incident has sparked discussions about the need for responsible reporting and the dangers of misinformation in an increasingly polarized world [bc9a0fcb].
In Okinawa, China is gaining online allies in the independence movement, with a key figure being Rob Kajiwara, a pro-independence activist who also aligns with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) [1771fc42]. Kajiwara's advocacy for Okinawa's independence coincides with his support for China's ethnic minority policies and denial of repression in Xinjiang and Tibet [1771fc42]. He also backs Beijing's stance on Hong Kong and Taiwan [1771fc42]. Despite advocating for Indigenous rights and self-determination, Kajiwara's social media content often mirrors CCP talking points, highlighting the influence of state-backed narratives in the digital age [1771fc42]. This trend raises questions about the integrity of online information and the power of Beijing to shape global narratives [1771fc42].
Foreign social media influencers in China, including Russian, UK, and US content creators, are also facing backlash for promoting a nationalist agenda on platforms like Douyin [99fcaba8]. While these influencers have gained millions of followers by creating videos that flatter various aspects of Chinese society, they are accused of pandering and creating overly effusive content, leading to criticism and insults from the audience [99fcaba8]. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) argues that Chinese state propaganda, when promoted through foreign influencers, can be insidious and effective, even on Western social media platforms [99fcaba8]. The report suggests that better labeling is needed to counter this influence [99fcaba8].
Furthermore, a recent report by European broadcasting outlet ARTE reveals that influencers on Chinese social media are promoting Han 'colonization' in Xinjiang, as part of President Xi Jinping's vision [cc4b3466]. These influencers, who are mouthpieces of Chinese propaganda, encourage people from eastern China to settle in Xinjiang to combat separatism and religious extremism [cc4b3466]. The Chinese government actively supports this settlement, contributing to the destruction of Uyghur identity [cc4b3466]. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), a paramilitary organization sanctioned for human rights abuses, employs one of the influencers highlighted in the documentary released by ARTE [cc4b3466]. The XPCC attracts settlers with promises of benefits such as arable land, free rent, and subsidies [cc4b3466]. While the concentration camp system and abuses in Xinjiang have been well-documented, influencers backed by Chinese state-propaganda entities present a positive image of the region [cc4b3466]. The Chinese government also organizes visits to Xinjiang for friendly journalists and diplomats to amplify Beijing's narratives and portray Xinjiang as a tourist destination to Sinicize the region and reshape its culture [cc4b3466]. The Xinjiang Department of Culture and Tourism has significantly increased its spending budget [cc4b3466].
In the Philippines, a pro-China network on Facebook has been spreading propaganda and disinformation for years [e3889f28]. These actors claim academic expertise and legitimacy, and their narratives are seen as propaganda and misinformation by the National Security Council [e3889f28]. Chinese influence in the Philippine online space is not new, with Facebook previously taking down inauthentic networks attributed to Chinese individuals [e3889f28]. Pro-China sentiment was formed during former president Rodrigo Duterte's administration, with pro-China posts being seeded within hyperpartisan communities [e3889f28]. The pro-China community on Facebook has become isolated and has a smaller reach [e3889f28]. Pro-China actors are shifting their resources to more on-ground activities, such as press conferences [e3889f28]. Prominent pro-China voices include the Integrated Development Studies Institute (IDSI) and bloggers like Sass Sasot [e3889f28]. The pro-China network's top sources of information online are IDSI, Anna Malindog-Uy, and the Asian Century Philippines Strategic Studies Institute (ACPSSI) [e3889f28].
Xenophobic online content on Chinese social media is raising concerns about the role of online speech in inciting real-world violence [a50693f0]. The Chinese government runs a public opinion machine that tolerates and encourages hate speech when directed at certain countries and their people [a50693f0]. The Chinese internet is filled with hate speech towards Japanese, Americans, Jews, Africans, and even Chinese citizens critical of the government [a50693f0]. The rise of nationalism under President Xi Jinping has contributed to this phenomenon [a50693f0]. The Chinese government censors the internet extensively but selectively allows hate speech towards certain targets [a50693f0]. Online influencers and intellectuals who try to combat misinformation and hate speech are often silenced or censored [a50693f0]. The recent attacks on foreigners in China have been praised on social media [a50693f0]. Chinese video platforms also contribute to spreading hate through short dramas that humiliate and insult foreigners [a50693f0]. Anti-American sentiment is also popular [a50693f0]. Chinese censors act swiftly to remove content they don't like, but hate speech continues to thrive [a50693f0]. Chinese internet platforms recently issued notices cracking down on hate speech targeting Japanese and inciting extreme nationalism, but it remains to be seen how effective these measures will be [a50693f0]. The Chinese government may use Japan and the United States as scapegoats again in the future [a50693f0]. The online environment in China has been breeding hatred, and it is unclear how much can change [a50693f0].
A series of stabbing attacks in China has raised concerns about growing social tensions [f367a489]. The attacks occurred in various locations across the country, targeting both individuals and groups [f367a489]. The motives behind the attacks are unclear, but some reports suggest they may be related to economic inequality and social unrest [f367a489]. The Chinese government has condemned the attacks and vowed to take action to maintain social stability [f367a489]. The incidents highlight the challenges faced by the Chinese government in addressing social issues and maintaining social harmony [f367a489].