As of November 2024, Beijing's foreign workforce has seen a significant decline, with only 22,000 foreigners living and working long-term in the capital, down from 37,000 a decade ago. This reduction means that foreigners now account for just 0.2% of the city's workforce and 0.1% of its total population [ad68343a]. The demographic composition of expatriates has also shifted; the percentage of Americans and Europeans has decreased from 16% in 2019 to 12%, while the proportion of Africans has increased to 31%, up from 26% [ad68343a]. Additionally, the number of Russians and Eastern Europeans has risen from 11% in 2019 to 16% [ad68343a].
In terms of education, 40% of expatriates in 2023 hold at least a master’s degree, and 20% meet the tier-A visa requirements, a notable increase from just 7% in 2018 [ad68343a]. This trend reflects a growing emphasis on highly skilled workers as China aims to position itself as a tech innovation hub by 2025 under President Xi Jinping's leadership [ad68343a].
However, the decline in foreign professionals is attributed to several challenges, including geopolitical tensions and a decoupling trend between global headquarters and their operations in China. These factors have made it increasingly difficult for foreign talent to navigate the employment landscape in Beijing [ad68343a].
Simultaneously, China's sparsely populated border with Central Asia is experiencing rapid demographic decline, raising concerns about population security. He Dan, director of the China Population and Development Research Centre, emphasizes the need for awareness of these issues [c5c5572b]. In the 40 western border counties, including Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, populations are dwindling, with many areas having fewer than 200,000 residents. For instance, Alashankou Port has a population of only 17,000, with just 3,423 permanent residents, while Manzhouli Port's population dropped from 128,900 in 2020 to 88,800 in 2023 [c5c5572b].
Overall, 86.67% of border cities are classified as small, and China's total population fell to 1.4 billion in 2023, with only 9 million births reported. The fertility rate in Central Asia remains above 3, while China's fertility rate has dropped to 1.09 in 2022, potentially falling below 1.0 in 2023. Notably, Shanghai's fertility rate fell to an alarming 0.6 in 2023 [c5c5572b]. This demographic shift poses significant implications for China's economic ambitions and border security, as the nation grapples with both a declining foreign workforce and a shrinking population in critical regions [c5c5572b].