The AUKUS alliance, established on September 15, 2021, marks its third anniversary this year, with Australia purchasing nuclear-powered submarines from the UK and US to enhance interoperability with US forces. This agreement has raised concerns about Australia's role in potentially destabilizing the Indo-Pacific region, as it aligns closely with US military strategies ([2ee8cbbf]). The alliance aims to deter China's regional 'adventurism' through enhanced military cooperation among Australia, the UK, and the US. However, analysts caution that without tangible results, AUKUS risks becoming 'nothing more than a label' ([678c759f]).
In addition to the submarine deal, Australia is actively involved in the Quad and Squad alliances, further solidifying its military ties with the US and other regional allies. The US has also established a presence in Darwin, allowing for the deployment of nuclear-capable planes, which has raised tensions in the region ([2ee8cbbf]). US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has stressed the importance of launching 'two or three signature projects' by January 20, 2025, to demonstrate AUKUS's effectiveness ([678c759f]).
Despite the strategic military enhancements, there are growing concerns about the financial implications of AUKUS. The program is estimated to cost $368 billion, with Australia contributing nearly $4.7 billion in taxpayer money to bolster the US submarine industrial base. Critics argue that this investment could have been better allocated to domestic needs, especially given the lack of clawback provisions similar to those criticized in the JobKeeper program ([687d3caf]).
Former Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating has voiced opposition to the notion that China poses a security threat, arguing that the narrative surrounding AUKUS may be exaggerated. He highlights that Australian exports to China surged from $84.8 billion in 2017 to $123 billion in 2022, indicating a complex economic relationship that contradicts the security rhetoric ([2ee8cbbf]).
The AUKUS pact is seen as a response to increasing threats in the Indo-Pacific, particularly from China's military expansion in the South China Sea. However, critics argue that the colossal cost and uncertainties surrounding the program could jeopardize Australia's alliance relationships and its own regional stability ([a90f33aa]). As the AUKUS partners move forward, the effectiveness of their collaboration in curbing China's assertiveness remains to be seen, with many urging for concrete outcomes to validate the alliance's existence and purpose ([678c759f]).
Adding to these concerns, Robbin Laird highlights the lack of political focus on defence readiness among AUKUS partners, emphasizing the need for supplies, logistics, and manpower to maintain a ready force. Air Vice-Marshal John Blackburn AO and Group Captain Anne Borzycki have critiqued the short-termism prevalent in Australian political culture, which impacts defence spending and preparedness. Peter Jennings has pointed out the significant influence of domestic politics on defence strategies, particularly the 36-month election cycle in Australia, warning of the lack of advocacy for AUKUS and the challenges facing submarine projects. He predicts a critical decision point in 2026 regarding the future of submarines, noting that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is less capable in 2024 than it was in 2022 ([1ab24bb6]).