The three-day Asia Security Forum concluded on Sunday with Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun's speech emphasizing Beijing's commitment to peace and adherence to international order. However, his remarks were questioned by representatives from other countries who accused China of contradicting its words with its actions. Experts analyze China's rhetoric on the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea issues and argue that China is turning a deaf ear to the concerns of other countries. They note that China is trying to portray itself as the spokesperson for the Asia-Pacific region and urging regional governments not to align with the United States. While Dong emphasized the need to find the right way for the two militaries to coexist, experts believe that China's language on the Taiwan Strait issue was sharper, attempting to warn the United States and Taiwan. On the South China Sea issue, Dong accused some countries of abandoning bilateral agreements and seriously undermining regional security and stability, but experts point out that China's interpretation of the ASEAN Charter is inaccurate. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also made rare accusations against China, accusing it of pressuring other countries not to attend the Ukrainian peace summit [59359ef4].
In a recent development, Sandra Oudkirk, the outgoing director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and de facto U.S. ambassador, has warned that China's actions around Taiwan, Japan, and the South China Sea could lead to an accidental conflict [11eb3cc4]. Oudkirk emphasized the United States' commitment to peace and stability in the region and urged China to avoid provocative actions. China has been increasing pressure on Taiwan in recent years, considering it as its own territory, while Taiwan rejects Beijing's sovereignty claims and seeks to defend itself with the support of the United States. Oudkirk's successor is Raymond Greene. This warning from a senior U.S. diplomat highlights the growing concerns over the potential for accidental conflict sparked by China's moves, adding to the existing tensions in the region [11eb3cc4].
According to Timothy R. Heath, a senior international defense researcher at the RAND Corporation, there is no evidence that China is on a high-end war footing or heading towards one. While China's military is modernizing and growing its capabilities, the national leadership does not appear to have the intention to fight a war in the near future. Chinese President Xi Jinping's focus is primarily on socioeconomic problems, and there is no evidence that he is calling for the whole nation to be prepared for war. China's defense spending is relatively modest, and its defense mobilization system remains flawed. However, there is a concern about low-intensity conflicts involving cyber, economic, and political tools. The U.S. and China are already engaged in a campaign of interference and provocation aimed at undermining each other's governments. The risk of high-end conflict still exists if a Chinese leader establishes a new political agenda and readies the state bureaucracy for war. Careful monitoring of Chinese senior leader statements, documents, and national war preparations is necessary, along with careful diplomacy on the part of the U.S. [9f32ba9f]
The Chinese and American militaries are behaving provocatively, increasing the risk of conflict. Recent events include armed Chinese coastguard ships entering disputed waters in the East China Sea, US forces participating in military drills in the South China Sea, and the deployment of Chinese logistics ships near Taiwan. Both China and the US are taking countermeasures and increasing military exercises in the Western Pacific. The US has deployed a mid-range missile system to the Philippines and is delivering unmanned aerial vehicles to the Indo-Pacific region. The US navy is also testing advanced network technologies. Economic interdependence and rational economic considerations have not prevented conflicts in the past. If China and the US do not address the underlying problems of their rivalry, the arms build-up could lead to war. [dee47db3]
Taiwanese Defence Minister Wellington Koo emphasized that Taiwan is not seeking war with China but is focusing on building a multi-level defensive deterrence to complicate China's invasion plans. Taiwan's strategy is to employ asymmetric warfare, making its forces more mobile and harder to target with vehicle-mounted missiles and drones. Taiwan President Lai Ching-te reiterated that Taiwan’s future should be decided by its people, rejecting Beijing’s sovereignty claims. Koo labeled China as the provocateur, asserting that Taiwan’s strategy remains defensive. U.S. strategic ambiguity adds uncertainty to China’s invasion plans. [b6e97ec2]
Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall stated that China is preparing for war with the United States, based on clear intelligence. China has been reoptimizing its forces for the past two decades to compete with the US in the Western Pacific. President Joe Biden suggested that China's economic problems make it less likely to invade Taiwan, while Republican congressman Mike Gallagher believes China's internal problems could make it more aggressive. War games have shown that the US military is unprepared for war with China. Kendall emphasized the need for the Air and Space Forces to increase their power projection and deter an invasion of Taiwan. [158d5f87]
China has been preparing for wartime sabotage in its cyber campaign against America. Chinese hacking group Volt Typhoon infiltrated Guam's communication systems in 2021, with the intention of carrying out disruptive or destructive cyber-attacks in the event of a major crisis or conflict. This marks a shift from traditional cyber-espionage to more aggressive and ambitious operations. Russia has also intensified its cyber-activities, targeting water facilities in Europe. These campaigns indicate a new era of wartime cyber-sabotage [30195222].
Taiwan's Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim has called for Taiwan to strengthen its defenses in response to China's coercive tactics and refusal to renounce the use of force to annex Taiwan. Hsiao emphasized that dialogue is the only way forward and that war is not an option. She highlighted the challenges Taiwan faces from authoritarian regimes, including political warfare, cyber intrusions, economic coercion, and military threats. Hsiao also discussed President Lai Ching-te's Four Pillars of Peace action plan, which focuses on strengthening Taiwan's defensive capabilities, economic resilience, international partnerships, and maintaining stable cross-strait relations. Hsiao reaffirmed Taiwan's commitment to democracy, peace, and prosperity and its desire to strengthen trade with like-minded democratic countries and participate meaningfully in international affairs. She also mentioned the G7 leaders' recent statements supporting peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Hsiao concluded by stating that Taiwan cannot take its freedom and peace for granted and must step up its defenses in response to China's coercion.
In a recent analysis by Gregory Graff and Alexis Dale-Huang, it is revealed that Chinese leaders perceive a global trend in which China is in the process of replacing the United States as the world's dominant power. The analysis suggests that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has become significantly more risk-tolerant in its thinking on escalation dynamics in space compared to a decade ago. The PLA's approach to deterrence and escalation in space prioritizes securing political objectives over avoiding conflict. Chinese leaders have an inflated perception of the threat posed by the United States and resist cooperating with the U.S. to prevent unintended crisis escalation. This has implications for U.S.-China relations and the management of crises in space. U.S. officials responsible for managing U.S.-China crises in space will likely need to adapt to compressed decision cycles with little communication to achieve a version of stability that Chinese leaders will tolerate. The analysis suggests that costly efforts or significant policy concessions to establish crisis communications mechanisms with the PLA should be avoided. The U.S. Space Force (USSF) can expect a bellicose PLA eager to assert itself in space during peacetime, as the PLA takes proactive steps and exhibits a higher risk tolerance. However, the PLA's actions in space remain subordinate to political decision-making [0ccb0cd6].
The China Landpower Studies Center at the U.S. Army War College produces research and analysis of China's strategic landpower for U.S. policymakers and military leaders. The U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) established the China Landpower Studies Center (CLSC) in January 2024 to respond to increased demand for research and analysis of China's strategic landpower. The CLSC is staffed with language researchers who understand the military dynamics between PLA ground forces, their joint services, and the Central Military Commission (CMC). The Center's research areas include understanding the strategic and operational environment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), assessing how the PLA is modernizing its strategies and organizations, and examining the relations between China, Russia, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The CLSC will also focus on how U.S. landpower plays a role in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific and will advise other nations on integrating their visions of multidomain operations. The Center will publish its research on its website, contribute to other outlets, and update its social media regularly. The annual Carlisle Conference on the PLA, hosted by the CLSC, will take place in October 2024.