[Tree] Public sentiment towards 2025 and political influences

Version 1.04 (2024-12-22 16:42:02.028000)

updates: Updated poll results and public sentiment analysis

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Version 1.03 (2024-12-22 14:53:15.847000)

updates: Increased hope for 2025; mixed economic sentiment

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Version 1.02 (2024-12-19 09:45:52.338000)

updates: Insights into key public opinion trends for 2025

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Version 1.01 (2024-12-12 22:47:58.920000)

updates: Updated favorability ratings and transition approval details

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Version 1.0 (2024-12-12 22:19:03.422000)

updates: Updated approval ratings and public sentiment insights

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Version 0.99 (2024-11-24 14:36:12.655000)

updates: Poll shows optimism for Trump's presidency and transition

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Version 0.98 (2024-11-24 05:35:52.514000)

updates: Trump's favorability ratings increased significantly.

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Version 0.97 (2024-11-21 21:43:05.215000)

updates: Added insights on Biden's role and Trump's legal issues

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Version 0.96 (2024-11-21 10:46:51.334000)

updates: Incorporated Trump's online strategy and cultural influences

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Version 0.95 (2024-11-18 22:38:55.177000)

updates: Added panel discussion insights and international reactions

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Version 0.94 (2024-11-18 20:39:20.713000)

updates: Added insights on voter turnout and economic issues

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Version 0.93 (2024-11-18 11:44:37.523000)

updates: Added insights on voter sentiment and demographics

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Version 0.92 (2024-11-18 06:49:40.532000)

updates: Added insights on Harris's campaign challenges

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Version 0.91 (2024-11-16 02:47:13.689000)

updates: Incorporated Robert Reich's analysis of voter turnout

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Version 0.9 (2024-11-14 01:38:27.495000)

updates: Added insights on Democratic criticisms and voter sentiments

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Version 0.89 (2024-11-13 14:19:07.661000)

updates: Democrats face blame for election loss factors

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Version 0.88 (2024-11-13 11:41:52.697000)

updates: Added analysis on candidate perception and misinformation

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Version 0.87 (2024-11-13 06:38:23.487000)

updates: Incorporated insights from young undecided voters

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Version 0.86 (2024-11-11 20:38:07.273000)

updates: Added details on campaign promises and voter concerns

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Version 0.85 (2024-11-11 14:44:27.264000)

updates: Integration of economic and political analysis post-election

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Version 0.84 (2024-11-10 15:53:50.640000)

updates: Harris's campaign struggles and criticisms highlighted

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Version 0.83 (2024-11-10 11:35:40.484000)

updates: Added Biden's economic achievements and voter perception

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Version 0.82 (2024-11-10 05:47:53.429000)

updates: Harris's campaign failed to address inflation effectively

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Version 0.81 (2024-11-07 02:35:05.557000)

updates: Incorporated recent voter dissatisfaction and economic analysis

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Version 0.8 (2024-11-06 09:35:13.069000)

updates: Updated economic data and voter sentiment insights

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Version 0.79 (2024-11-03 18:39:06.702000)

updates: Updated economic indicators and election context

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Version 0.78 (2024-11-03 09:34:53.453000)

updates: Incorporated new economic analysis and public sentiment data

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Version 0.77 (2024-11-01 20:36:03.742000)

updates: Job growth slows, inflation remains low, consumer spending strong

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Version 0.76 (2024-11-01 15:37:30.145000)

updates: Incorporated new perspectives on U.S. economy and voting importance.

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Version 0.75 (2024-10-31 17:37:31.823000)

updates: Incorporated job creation statistics and GDP comparisons.

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Version 0.74 (2024-10-31 16:36:52.057000)

updates: Incorporated latest economic data and election context

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Version 0.73 (2024-10-31 15:34:53.852000)

updates: Trump's mixed messages about economic performance

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Version 0.72 (2024-10-31 10:36:22.923000)

updates: Updated economic statistics and election context

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Version 0.71 (2024-10-31 04:42:05.501000)

updates: Trump contrasts current economy with 2020 conditions

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Version 0.7 (2024-10-31 00:39:15.567000)

updates: GDP growth defies recession predictions; inflation down.

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Version 0.69 (2024-10-30 21:47:27.860000)

updates: Incorporated latest economic data and voter sentiment

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Version 0.68 (2024-10-30 12:46:56.053000)

updates: Updated growth rate and inflation impact on voters

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Version 0.67 (2024-10-30 12:37:55.912000)

updates: Updated GDP growth rate and job market details

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Version 0.66 (2024-10-30 10:39:11.086000)

updates: Updated economic growth figures and voter sentiment

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Version 0.65 (2024-10-30 10:36:48.856000)

updates: Updated GDP growth and consumer confidence data

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Version 0.64 (2024-10-30 08:37:18.049000)

updates: Incorporated latest GDP growth forecasts and consumer spending data

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Version 0.63 (2024-10-30 06:40:27.334000)

updates: Incorporated latest economic forecasts and election context

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Version 0.62 (2024-10-30 06:36:09.056000)

updates: Added details on consumer spending and GDP growth

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Version 0.61 (2024-10-30 05:38:54.929000)

updates: Incorporated election impact and credit card delinquency data

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Version 0.6 (2024-10-30 04:36:21.604000)

updates: Updated GDP growth rate and economic outlook

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Version 0.59 (2024-10-30 04:34:53.826000)

updates: Updated GDP growth forecast and consumer spending data

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Version 0.58 (2024-10-28 19:35:19.026000)

updates: Increased market volatility and economic resilience noted.

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Version 0.57 (2024-10-28 08:34:54.994000)

updates: Added recent GDP and employment updates

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Version 0.56 (2024-10-28 05:35:11.549000)

updates: Forecasts for growth and recession odds improved

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Version 0.55 (2024-10-28 00:37:36.779000)

updates: Integration of recent economic data and forecasts

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Version 0.54 (2024-10-26 20:35:23.813000)

updates: Updated employment and GDP forecasts ahead of Fed meeting

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Version 0.53 (2024-10-24 13:38:09.115000)

updates: September growth decline and Chicago Fed index update

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Version 0.52 (2024-10-24 10:36:32.058000)

updates: Updated insights on consumer spending and political risks

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Version 0.51 (2024-10-21 13:42:52.675000)

updates: Incorporated insights on job market dynamics and investor outlook

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Version 0.5 (2024-10-08 03:41:01.282000)

updates: Goldman Sachs lowers recession odds to 15%; job gains rise.

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Version 0.49 (2024-10-07 07:36:24.808000)

updates: Goldman Sachs lowers recession odds to 15% after jobs report

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Version 0.48 (2024-09-29 02:35:47.857000)

updates: Added insights from Universa's Mark Spitznagel

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Version 0.47 (2024-09-27 16:46:40.431000)

updates: Added insights from Black Swan Fund on recession risks

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Version 0.46 (2024-09-24 12:48:42.521000)

updates: Yield curves normalize; US economy shows growth

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Version 0.45 (2024-09-06 21:38:04.445000)

updates: Updated economic indicators and stock market performance

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Version 0.44 (2024-09-06 04:44:48.713000)

updates: Yield curve normalization raises recession concerns; ADP jobs report shows weak growth.

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Version 0.43 (2024-08-13 17:15:31.126000)

updates: Bank of America warns of potential recession in 2024

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Version 0.42 (2024-08-09 20:03:36.167000)

updates: Debate surrounding possibility of a soft landing for US economy

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Version 0.41 (2024-08-04 18:59:31.741000)

updates: Macroeconomics expert warns of hard landing for US economy

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Version 0.4 (2024-07-31 19:02:55.011000)

updates: Includes warning from George Gammon about impending recession and banking crisis

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Version 0.39 (2024-07-29 16:01:13.466000)

updates: Updates on the US yield curve and its predictive power

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Version 0.38 (2024-07-13 17:55:32.454000)

updates: Inclusion of information about 26 countries facing inverted yield curves and concerns of a global economic slowdown

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Version 0.37 (2024-07-08 18:54:34.941000)

updates: The US Treasury yield curve inversion has continued for over two years, raising concerns of a potential recession

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Version 0.36 (2024-07-07 15:56:27.584000)

updates: Includes analysis of the labor market and its impact on the lack of recession despite the inverted yield curve

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Version 0.35 (2024-07-02 19:58:45.641000)

updates: Includes analysis of the labor market and its impact on the lack of recession despite the inverted yield curve

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Version 0.34 (2024-06-28 04:54:14.134000)

updates: The US yield curve inversion has reached a new record of almost two years. Despite the prolonged inversion, a recession has not materialized, and the US economy continues to perform well. Economists attribute this to high consumer savings and the Federal Reserve's management of last year's banking turmoil. The current inversion of the yield curve in the US is seen more as a sign that the old growth 'boom times' will not return so quickly. [98b348f6]

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Version 0.33 (2024-06-24 14:55:29.132000)

updates: Updates on the duration of the yield curve inversion and the lack of recession

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Version 0.32 (2024-06-23 17:54:23.045000)

updates: Inclusion of analysis suggesting a 52% chance of a recession in the US economy within the next year based on the Federal Reserve model utilizing the US Treasury yield curve

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Version 0.31 (2024-06-06 22:55:28.926000)

updates: The US Treasury yield curve inversion has reached a new record length, but a recession has not materialized. The yield curve has been inverted for 624 days, surpassing the previous record of 419 days set in 1980. The lack of recession is attributed to high consumer savings and the Federal Reserve's actions to stabilize the banking sector. Despite the prolonged inversion, the US economy continues to perform well. Some market watchers have abandoned the yield curve indicator as a predictor of recession, while others remain proponents of it. The yield curve is now shifting, with long-term yields rising and short-term yields remaining unchanged. The possibility of a bear steepening and a return to a normal yield curve is being considered. Recent months have seen a moderation in recession calls as the US economy continues to expand and unemployment remains low. The inverted yield curve, which traditionally signals a recession, has been in place for the longest stretch on record, but the recession has not materialized. The yield curve doesn't normalize until something significant changes, such as signs of economic slowing, a geopolitical shock, a housing market crash, or a stock market bubble bursting. Economic warning signs are flashing, but the trillions of dollars of pandemic-fighting monetary and fiscal stimulus have delayed the effects of the yield curve. The jobless rate could rise if GDP growth falls below potential.

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Version 0.3 (2024-06-04 16:55:15.255000)

updates: The article provides additional insights on the prolonged inversion of the yield curve, the lack of recession despite the inversion, the potential normalization of the curve through a bear steepening, and the ongoing debate about the reliability of the yield curve as a recession indicator.

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Version 0.29 (2024-06-03 11:54:29.581000)

updates: The reliability of the inverted yield curve as a recession indicator is being questioned amidst a prolonged inversion

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Version 0.28 (2024-06-01 05:56:08.659000)

updates: Updated information on the US yield curve inversion and potential economic implications

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Version 0.27 (2024-04-29 06:53:04.980000)

updates: The US yield curve may normalize through bear steepening

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Version 0.26 (2024-04-29 05:51:14.470000)

updates: The US yield curve may normalize through bear steepening

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Version 0.25 (2024-04-23 16:19:05.019000)

updates: The yield curve inversion continues for 18 months, indicating a looming recession

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Version 0.24 (2024-04-23 13:19:21.180000)

updates: The yield curve inversion continues for 18 months, indicating a looming recession

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Version 0.23 (2024-04-22 01:20:28.116000)

updates: Includes information about the historic length of the yield curve inversion and its potential implications for a stock market crash

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Version 0.22 (2024-04-02 21:20:25.818000)

updates: Added information from The Globe and Mail article about the ongoing debate regarding the yield curve indicator and the odds of a recession in 2024

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Version 0.21 (2024-03-22 08:17:49.322000)

updates: Federal Reserve's outlook on interest rates and inflation

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Version 0.2 (2024-03-21 16:17:24.853000)

updates: The US Treasury yield curve inversion has become the longest on record, but a recession has not materialized

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Version 0.19 (2024-03-19 22:22:42.998000)

updates: Economist David Rosenberg remains skeptical of a US recession

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Version 0.18 (2024-03-17 11:21:05.074000)

updates: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Recession Probability Indicator suggests a 58.31% chance of a recession by February 2025. Other metrics also point to a significant downturn for the stock market. Historically, recessions have been short-lived events.

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Version 0.17 (2024-03-15 14:18:29.094000)

updates: Updates on unemployment, Sahm rule, and US Federal Reserve's interest rates

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Version 0.16 (2024-03-13 15:17:55.117000)

updates: New information on the combination of ISM Manufacturing New Orders Index and yield curve as recession indicators

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Version 0.15 (2024-02-29 00:17:13.359000)

updates: The article highlights that while the bond yield curve has been inverted for 16 months, a catalyst for a recession is missing. It mentions that past recessions were triggered by events like Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the bursting of the dot-com bubble, and the global pandemic. The likelihood of a soft landing or a hard landing downturn is debated by top commentators.

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Version 0.14 (2024-02-24 10:18:16.543000)

updates: Economists expected a recession in the US in 2023, but the economy remained strong. The Federal Reserve is projected to achieve a soft landing, taming inflation without triggering a recession. The US economy is currently projected to expand at an annualized 2.9% in Q1 2024. Recession fears have melted away.

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Version 0.13 (2024-02-24 10:17:09.758000)

updates: The bond market signals a possible recession by the end of next month

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Version 0.12 (2024-02-13 01:24:54.544000)

updates: The article highlights the persistence of the yield curve inversion despite strong economic growth, low unemployment, and falling inflation rates in the US. It suggests that the Federal Reserve Board may have been too aggressive in raising interest rates and is now being too cautious in bringing them down. Recent commentary from Fed board members indicates a shift in the goal posts for rate cuts, with a focus on a widespread fall in inflation across the economy. Bond investors appear more cautious than sharemarket investors, seeking extra compensation for the perceived increased risk. The risk of leaving monetary policies too tight for too long could lead to economic slowdowns and recessions. The US economy's trajectory will depend on the actions of the Fed over the next few months. [00f1a217]

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Version 0.11 (2024-02-11 13:54:54.350000)

updates: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York's leading indicator suggests a 61.47% probability of a recession in the US by or before January 2025.

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Version 0.1 (2024-02-11 10:51:27.055000)

updates: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York's recession probability tool suggests a 61.47% likelihood of a recession by January 2025.

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Version 0.09 (2024-02-06 12:11:29.022000)

updates: Discussion of recent economic data and the Fed's hint of interest rate cuts

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Version 0.08 (2024-01-26 12:54:31.856000)

updates: Inclusion of economist Campbell Harvey's prediction of a US economic slowdown in 2025

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Version 0.07 (2024-01-24 09:59:39.296000)

updates: Uncertainty in US economy in 2025, concerns of slowdown/recession

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Version 0.06 (2024-01-21 09:04:45.422000)

updates: Inverted yield curve inventor predicts a slowdown in the US economy in 2024

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Version 0.05 (2023-11-09 17:24:10.397000)

updates: Restructured and enhanced the narrative for improved clarity and impact

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Version 0.04 (2023-11-07 11:29:15.043000)

updates: Restructured and enhanced the narrative for clarity and impact

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Version 0.03 (2023-10-22 13:49:24.361000)

updates: Rephrased and consolidated information, added historical perspective

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Version 0.02 (2023-10-17 14:39:10.003000)

updates: Incorporated information from Knowledge at Wharton article

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Version 0.01 (2023-10-13 20:28:55.045000)

updates: The story provides a more comprehensive analysis of the changing dynamics of yield curves and their implications for recession signals, incorporating insights from Goldman Sachs and recent developments in the US Treasury bond market.

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Version 0.0 (2023-10-09 16:14:32.324000)

updates:

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