[Tree] The historical significance of Wu Tingfang in US-China relations

Version 0.15 (2024-06-28 23:55:37.061000)

updates: Inclusion of the historical figure Wu Tingfang and his role in US-China relations

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Version 0.14 (2024-06-02 11:09:23.323000)

updates: Inclusion of Crosby Textor's involvement in advising pro-Beijing officials in Hong Kong

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Version 0.13 (2024-06-01 03:22:40.122000)

updates: Incorporated information about the erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy and its implications for the United States

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Version 0.12 (2024-05-19 14:31:56.771000)

updates: Incorporated information about China's support for Russia and its impact on Hong Kong and Taiwan

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Version 0.11 (2024-04-29 02:46:47.720000)

updates: The article discusses Pastor Bob Fu's work and his impact on the U.S.-China relationship

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Version 0.1 (2024-04-25 01:52:43.584000)

updates: Expert expresses pessimism about the future of US-China relations

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Version 0.09 (2024-04-22 22:20:57.386000)

updates: The US-China relationship is the most consequential one for the world and will likely remain competitive. The US security portrayal of China is not simply black and white and this has remained substantively consistent over time. Mistrust does not necessarily prohibit cooperation. And greater competition between the US and China does not constrain other countries to choosing one or the other. The US depicts China as a national security threat mainly in the inter-related economic and cybersecurity domains. In the military and political sectors, the US representation of China is more as a risk to the international community. The US-China relationship has not securitized the societal aspect. Despite disagreements and growing mistrust, cooperation may occur even between untrustworthy parties as long as there are payoffs and structures in place. The Cold War demonstrated that greater differences may instead allow more space for other countries to play one off against the other. It is important to dispel myths about the US-China relationship to avoid self-fulfilling prophecies.

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Version 0.08 (2024-04-13 02:20:35.172000)

updates: The US misreads the strategic landscape in its competition with China

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Version 0.07 (2024-04-11 11:21:04.667000)

updates: China's stance on the US presidential election remains unclear

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Version 0.06 (2024-03-28 05:28:21.293000)

updates: Taiwan's foreign ministry expects continued US support regardless of election outcome

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Version 0.05 (2024-01-13 12:21:18.445000)

updates: China's increasing pressure on Taiwan and the need for Taiwan's political parties to align with the US and strengthen defense capabilities

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Version 0.04 (2024-01-11 07:19:24.649000)

updates: The leader of Taiwan's opposition party, Kuomintang (KMT), Johnny Chiang, has ruled out unification talks with China. This marks a shift in the KMT's stance on cross-strait relations, as the party has traditionally advocated for closer ties with China. The failure of the KMT and Taiwan People's Party (TPP) to form an alliance in the 2024 presidential election raises concerns about the security situation in Taiwan.

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Version 0.03 (2024-01-10 07:50:56.370000)

updates: Taiwan's changing identity and China's growing strength

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Version 0.02 (2024-01-05 08:09:30.057000)

updates: Integration of the defense policy of the KMT and the implications of the election on defense

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Version 0.01 (2023-11-28 12:49:22.947000)

updates: Opposition alliance talks falling apart

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Version 0.0 (2023-11-20 07:31:16.153000)

updates:

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